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ECONOMETRIC MODELLING OF COMPETITION 
BETWEEN TRAIN TICKET TYPES 
Mark Wardman, Jeremy Toner 
Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The railways in Britain have a long history of using price discrimination backed 
up with product differentiation to significantly increase revenue over what might 
be obtained in an undifferentiated market. Whilst not as sophisticated as the 
yield management systems widely used in the airline industry, rail ticketing 
strategies are continually evolving, with new products emerging, unsuccessful 
products discontinued and gradual refinement of others. 
In recent years, there has been increased interest in modelling competition 
between different ticket types. The re-organisation of the railway industry in 
Great Britain has provided a greater commercial incentive to operators to price 
differentiate in order to maximise the revenue from their franchises. The policy 
of moderation of competition has allowed limited on-track competition, largely 
based around overlapping franchises but also with service extensions and new 
entrants, and this has stimulated product development and hence interest in 
ticket choice. Partly in response to the greater commercialisation of the railway 
industry, particularly where here is a degree of market power, the regulatory 
bodies have taken a greater interest in the range of tickets offered and their 
associated prices, travel restrictions and availability (SRA, 2003). 
This paper reports on research which was conducted as part of an update to 
the Passenger Demand Forecasting Handbook (PDFH), which contains a 
forecasting framework and recommended demand parameters that are widely 
used in the railway industry in Great Britain (ATOC, 2002), and as part of a 
project to provide the Strategic Rail Authority with evidence on cross elasticities 
between ticket types for use in its review of how it regulates rail fares. 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Ticket Structure 
Historically the railways in Britain charged fares according to the distance 
travelled with a 50% mark-up for first class travel compared with standard. 
Indeed, the Railway Act, 1844 (commonly known as the "Parliamentary Trains 
Act") deriving from Gladstone's Committee of Inquiry into railway policy, 
specified that railway companies had to provide a minimum service: one train 
each day each way, travelling at not less than 12 miles per hour and stopping 
at every station, charging no more than Id. per mile for third class passengers. 
As the railways developed, so the pricing structure emlved, with lower-priced 
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excursion tickets as the leisure market grew and discounts for regular travellers 
by the use of season tickets as commuting increased. Nevertheless, it was still 
the case in about 1980 that fares were based on mileage, just that the mileage 
rate varied according to the ticket type (first class, second class, cheap day 
return, weekend return, economy return). Since then, we have seen the 
development of an increasingly market based fare structure where prices are 
based on what, the market will bear with the objective of increasing revenue, 
encouraging off-peak travel and discouraging peak travel. The distinctions on 
any one route rely primarily on segmentations according to peak or off-peak 
travel, with off-peak tickets invalid at certain times of day. Across routes, 
distinctions are apparent according to the size of the available capacity relative 
to the (potential) demand. Thus, while an unrestricted standard class return 
from Manchester to London is priced at £175 for a (one-way) distance of 186 
miles, the equivalent ticket for the 189 mile Leeds to London journey is £132. 
For off-peak travel, though, the prices are £50 and £63.30 respectively. 
As well as the traditional walk-on fares, we have seen massive growth in 
advance purchase tickets based on the yield management techniques widely 
used by airlines. Some operators have sought to promote these ahead of walk- 
on categories which, apart from the full fare tickets, have seen increasing 
restrictions on when they can be used. This has led to a greater range of tickets 
being offered. New low prices are available for those able to plan ahead and 
not requiring flexibility to change travel plans but at the expense of increased 
real prices for users requiring the walk-on facility. Thus from Leeds to London, 
those booking 7 days ahead can purchase a return for £25 or £36 (sold by 
quota so that the ticket becomes unavailable when the quota for a particular 
train has been reached); and from Manchester to London, returns are available 
(subject to quota) at £22, £31 and £42 booking 14, 7 and 3 days ahead 
respectively. Groups of 4 travelling together can obtain even lower prices; £72 
from Manchester to London, £54 from Leeds to London and £48 in both cases 
if travel is via the competing Midland Mainline service. In all there are 33 
quoted fares from Leeds to London and 28 from Manchester to London. This is 
before one considers the discounts open to those aged 16-24, those aged over 
60 and family groups, all of which are available on the purchase of a railcard. 
2.2 Rail Ticket Sales Models 
Since the 1 9701s, rail ticket sales data in Great Britain has provided a means by 
which the properties of rail travel behaviour can be examined. These aggregate 
direct demand models have been developed to examine the impact on rail 
demand of factors external to the rail industry, such as the levels of income, 
employment, car ownership and competition from other modes, as well as the 
impacts of fare and service quality which are directly under the control of train 
companies. Fares are central determinants of the revenue earned by train 
companies and this, along with the traditionally strong interest in Britain in 
pursuing price differentiation and market segmentation, has resulted in a 
considerable amount of empirical analysis in this area (Hughes, 1980; Oldfield 
and Tyler, 1981; Stark, 1981; Rail Operational Research 1982, 1989, 1995a, 
1995b, 1995c; Glaister, 1983; Owen and Phillips, 1987; Phillips, 1987; 
Wardman, 1997a, 1997b; AEAT, 1999). A recent meta-analysis of British 
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evidence (Wardman and Shires, 2003) uncovered 99 fare elasticity values for 
suburban rail travel and 456 values for inter-urban travel, and by far the largest 
source of this evidence is studies which have analysed ticket sales data. 
These models can be split into those which pooled data across ticket types and 
those which aimed to improve upon this approach by estimating separate 
models for different ticket types. There are a number of drawbacks of pooling 
data across different ticket types. These are: 
The usual means of representing fare in these models has been to use 
average revenue per trip. This can lead to misleading and in some 
instances even wrong sign estimates of the market elasticity. 
Estimating a single model fails to provide important insights into different 
levels of price sensitivity by ticket type and the degree of substitutability 
which are essential to effective price discrimination 
A single model constrains all other variables, such as those relating to 
service quality and to external factors, to be the same across the 
different market segments which the various tickets cater for. This is 
unlikely to be empirically justified. 
Estimating a single model to pooled data reduces the amount of data 
and could result in less variation in fare than otherwise. These will result 
in less precise coefficient estimates. 
Some ticket sales based studies have estimated separate models by ticket 
type. In such cases, it is necessary to specify appropriate cross elasticity terms 
but most have not done so (Owen and Phillips, 1987; Phillips, 1987; Wardman, 
1997b; Ahmed, 1998; CEBR, 1998; Steer Davies Gleave, 1999). However, 
attempts were made in Britain in the 1990's to estimate elasticities specific to 
particular categories of ticket and the cross-elasticities between them. 
Rail Operational Research (1995a) examined competition between Travelcard 
season tickets, which also allow travel on bus and underground in London, and 
point-to-point seasons. This covered trips in the South East to London between 
1987 and 1994. The key findings are reported in Table I. The cross-elasticities 
of point-to-point seasons with respect to Travelcard fare vary considerably, and 
by more than would be expected according to variation in market share, but 
there was no evidence of a cross-elasticity effect on Travelcard demand. 
Table 1: Analysis of Travelcard and Point-to-Point Sales 
Ticket Type Distance Own Cross 
-. 
Elasticity Elasticity 
Travelcard Within Boundary -0.5 - 
Across Boundary -0.8 - 
Point-to-Point Within Boundary -0.3 2.00 
Across Boundary -0.5 0.15 
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AEAT (1999) conducted a major investigation into fare elasticities based on the 
analysis of annual ticket sales data covering the period 1991 to 1999 for over 
5000 flows. The main purpose was to estimate fare elasticities disaggregated 
by ticket type and the relevant crosselasticities. The four ticket types 
considered were: first class; standard full fare, where there are no travel 
restrictions; standard reduced fare, where travel is not permitted in the peak; 
and Apex, where advance purchase is required and travel restrictions apply. It 
was assumed that passengers would not be prepared to trade-down by more 
than two categories or to trade-up by more than one category. 
The elasticity estimates along with 95% confidence intervals are presented in 
Table 2. There are two immediately apparent features of the results. Firstly, two 
of the eight estimated cross-elasticities are wrong sign. Secondly, the precision 
with which the cross elasticities are estimated is not generally high. 
Table 2: Inter-Urban Ticket Type Models 
Ticket Type Own Cross Elasticities 
Elasticity First Full Reduced Apex 
First non Season -0.6 ffl.08 0.06 M.03 0 0 
Standard Class Full -0.7 f0.05 -0.01 f 0.01 -0.08 f 0.03 0 
Standard Class Reduced -0.4 M.03 0.01 f0.01 0.03 fO.O1 0.05 fO.O1 
Standard Class APEX -0.3 ffl.12 0 0.02 f0.03 0.33 fO.08 
Note: Given the form of model estimated, the own elasticities are conditional 
A simpler model was also estimated, distinguishing only between what were 
termed premium fares, covering first class and standard class full fares, and 
discount fares, incorporating reduced and Apex fares. The models are reported 
in Table 3 and fared little better, with one crosselasticity wrong sign despite 
being statistically significant. 
Table 3: Simplified Inter-Urban Ticket Type Models 
Ticket Type Own Elasticity Cross Elasticity 
Premium -1.1 f0.04 -0.08 M.02 
Discount -0.6 k0.05 0.18 k0.03 
With regard to the estimation of cross-elasticities AEAT (1999) concluded that, 
"Estimation of this effect is fraught with problems, even with our large sample 
size". There are two principal difficulties encountered by ticket sales models 
which endeavour to estimate separate models by ticket type: 
a There is strong correlation between the fares of different ticket types 
given the common practice of applying across the board annual fare 
O Association for European Transport 2003 4 
revisions. This means that the fare coefficients will be estimated less 
precisely than otherwise, and the model will have problems 
discerning their separate effects. The positive correlation between 
fares will result in negative correlation amongst the coefficient 
estimates. Thus an own elasticity (in absolute) will be too large 
(small) and a cross elasticity too large (small). 
Cross elasticities tend to be somewhat smaller than own elasticities 
and thus are inherently more difficult to estimate precisely. 
To the extent that there are common effects across ticket types, the estimation 
of separate models for each ticket type, as opposed to a joint estimation 
procedure, is inefficient and will lead to less precise coefficient estimates. 
Moreover, the estimation of separate models fails to exploit demand variation in 
one model that contributes to an understanding of demand variation in another. 
2.3 Why Aggregate Models? 
Disaggregate choice models estimated to the decisions individuals make are 
particularly well suited to the analysis of competition between tickets, covering 
travel restrictions and aspects of service quality differentiation as well as 
different fares. Where there are currently a range of tickets with different 
features, revealed preference (RP) methods are suitable. These can be 
enhanced with stated preference (SP) exercises, particularly where new tickets 
are under investigation. There have been a number of British studies that have 
conducted disaggregate analysis of choices between tickets (Steer Davies 
Gleave, 1993; Accent and HCG, 1996; Rail Operational Research, 1996; 
Whelan et al., 1997; Wardman and Murphy, 1999). 
Although disaggregate approaches have a number of attractions and the 
sophisticated market can be expected to support the development of robust 
models, the analysis here is based on aggregate methods which examine 
variations in the volume of rail demand between specified stations. There are a 
number of reasons why we have adopted an aggregate approach: 
A large amount of reliable ticket sales data is available at relatively 
low cost. At the least, this complements analysis based on more 
disaggregate means. 
There is an opportunity to use more sophisticated analytical methods 
to overcome the difficulties faced in previous studies. 
Aggregate data more readily supports the analysis of external 
factors, and thus it is possible to simultaneously estimate separate 
GDP and other elasticities for the market segments covered by the 
different ticket types 
The resulting models fit relatively easily into the demand forecasting 
procedures contained in the PDFH. 
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Variations in fares not only stimulate switching between ticket types 
but can lead to significant variations in the total volume of rail travel. 
This variation is automatically included within aggregate models. 
Disaggregate ticket choice models can be complex to develop, given 
the wide range of tickets available and travellers' limited information 
about many of them. Application of the models for forecasting need 
to address the serious misperceptions that will exist regarding the 
range of tickets and their characteristics whilst appropriate 
forecasting methods have heavy data requirements. 
Another paper at this conference examines the impact of changes in the fares 
of different tickets at a more detailed level (Whelan and Johnson, 2003). 
3. MODELLING APPROACH 
As we have seen, previous studies which have examined competition between 
ticket types based on ticket sales data have not met with a great deal of 
success. Some models failed to specify cross elasticities whilst those that did 
often found them to be either wrong sign or statistically insignificant. Our 
conclusion as to the cause of these problems is the high degree of correlation 
between the fares of different tickets. This compounds the already difficult task 
of estimating what are relatively small effects. 
A way forward is to harness relationships from economic theory, a procedure 
which has often been neglected in the empirical analysis of travel demand data. 
Two relationships are of particular interest here. The Slutsky symmetry 
equation expresses the relationship between two income compensated cross 
fare elasticities as: 
Vi is the volume of sales of ticket i and Fi is the fare of ticket i, whereupon the 
cross-elasticity of demand for ticket j with respect to the fare of ticket i is equal 
to the product of the cross-elasticity of demand for ticket i with respect to the 
fare of ticket j and the relative revenue of the two tickets. The relationship 
relies upon the assumptions of neoclassical micro-economic theory and, since 
it applies at the individual level, we must assume that aggregate behaviour 
reflects that of the typical individual. However, an additional relationship exists 
between cross and own elasticities (Dodgson, 1986) that is true by definition: 
The cross-elasticity of ticket type i with respect to the price of ticket type j can 
be deduced from the own price elasticity of demand for ticket j (fii), the relative 
share of the two tickets (VINi) and what is termed the diversion factor (6j) which 
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denotes the proportion of those who divert from ticket j to ticket i when ticket j 
becomes unacceptable to them. 
On London routes, four generic ticket types cover the vast majority of now 
season ticket sales relevant to the business and leisure markets. These are: 
First class tickets, which allow travel on this premium product at 
anytime and can be bought at anytime; 
Standard class full fare tickets, where travel is allowed at anytime 
and the tickets can be bought at anytime; 
Standard reduced fare tickets, which place restrictions on the time of 
travel but which can be bought at anytime; 
Standard class Apex tickets, which allow travel only on specified 
trains and which must be purchased in advance. Their availability is 
quota controlled. 
We can specify a system of demand equations to cover these generic tickets. 
Adopting the standard constant elasticity form and ignoring terms other than a 
size factor (a) for each we have: 
The demand for first (I), full (F) and reduced (R) ticket types are a function of 
their own fare and the fares of the other tickets except Apex. The assumption 
within this framework is that the demand for Apex is supply constrained, that is, 
more tickets than the quota (Q) available could be sold at the price charged. An 
Apex fare elasticity therefore has no meaning. As far as the other tickets are 
concerned, it makes sense to relate the demand for them not to the Apex fare 
but to its availability. 
Apex is a quota controlled ticket, and the quotas are set per train rather than at 
the level of the Lj flow which is the unit at which the analysis is undertaken. 
Even if train operating companies had historical data on Apex quotas and were 
prepared to supply such information, it would be of little use to us since we 
have no way of knowing how the quotas related to specific i-j movements. 
However, a good proxy for the competition offered by Apex is the actual sales 
of these tickets, and this is available alongside the sales of other tickets. Hence 
the volume of Apex sales (VA) enters the demand functions above. We return to 
the specification of this term below. 
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Given that fares often move in parallel, the own elasticities (fir, ~ F F  and ~RR) will 
not provide an accurate reflection of the demand change after a common 
proportionate charge in all fares because there will also be second order 
effects due to switching between ticket types. In such cases, we can derive the 
conditional elasticity (C) for a particular ticket as the sum its own elasticity and 
the cross elasticities with respect to the fares of other tickets. 
The overall elasticity (qoc) when all fares are changed in the same proportion is 
the sum of all the conditional elasticities each weighted by their volume share: 
An appropriate estimation procedure can be used to exploit all the data within a 
single estimation and ensure that the theoretical relationships between the 
parameters of equations 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 are satisfied. Given Q is not known, 
the analysis is restricted to the demand for first, full and reduced tickets. 
For any ticket k, the volume of rail demand between stations i and j in time 
period t is here specified as: 
P represents the fare of ticket k and of two competing tickets (I and m) with own 
elasticity fkk and cross elasticities fkl and fk,. 
Generalised journey time (GT) is the standard measure of timetable related 
service quality used in the railway industry in Britain. It contains statiomto- 
station journey time, service headway and interchange and is expressed as an 
equivalent amount of journey time. 
Since GT varies across ticket types as a result of, for example, different time of 
travel restrictions, it is therefore possible, in principle, to estimate GT cross 
elasticities between ticket types. However, the limited variation in GT on 
London based flows means that it is a challenge to estimate a significant and 
plausible own GT elasticity let alone a cross elasticity and thus we therefore did 
not proceed with such a specification. 
G and 0 are measures of per capita GDP and population relevant to the origin, 
T and C represent car time and cost, and H is the proportion of households in 
the origin with a car. The parameters a, p, y, K and h are all elasticities. H 
enters h this rather than constant elasticity form since the parameter 8 was 
obtained from analysis of National Travel Survey data and used this functional 
form, albeit with H taking only the values of 0 or 1, to estimate the effect of 
whether a household had a car on the number of rail trips made. The elasticity 
with respect to car ownership is €)Hit. 
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pij~ is a size effect, representing the generating potential of origin stations not 
accounted for by income and population and the attracting potential of 
destination stations. To avoid specifying variables to represent effects which 
are not of interest here, we can instead examine changes in demand between 
two time periods (1 and 2) and assume that pijkt is effectively constant. The 
model then takes the form: 
In equations 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 above, allowance was made for the effect of Apex 
sales (VA) on the demand for each ticket. The most realistic approach would be 
to allow changes in VA to have an additive effect, whereupon the change in VA 
would reduce the demand for a ticket k (VK) by some proportion of VA (~k). This 
could be achieved within the above multiplicative model by instead specifying 
the term containing VA as: 
The shortcoming with this approach is that the elasticities can vary quite 
considerably. Each elasticity in equation 6 would, for each ticket type, be 
multiplied by: 
Whilst we have no objections in principle to variations in elasticities, it would be 
a step-change in the procedures involved in PDFH which might not prove 
acceptable, whilst empirical studies which test for elasticity variation within 
ticket sales models struggle to obtain convincing and statistically significant 
effects let alone the potentially large variation implied by this formulation. 
In order to leave the elasticities unaffected, we could have entered VA in 
constant elasticity form. However, this would be unrealistic since a given 
proportionate change in VA will have a larger impact on Vk when VA is large 
relative to Vk than when it is small. Alternatively, VA could enter in exponential 
form. The final term would then be: 
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This would not impact on the elasticities. It implies that a given absolute 
difference VA will have the same proportionate impact on K, but this will not 
generally be the case. We specified VA as in equation 6 which is the same as in 
equation 9 but deflated by the actual volume of Apex kips in the based period 
since this gave the best fit to the data. 
It is not possible to estimate sensible parameters for all the external factors 
simultaneously, since they are so highly correlated. The solution is to isolate 
the effects of 0, T, C and H by constraining y, K, h and 0 to equal the best 
estimates available, and to freely estimate the GDP elasticity (P) which is then 
conditional upon the constraints used. 
The base year (1) is taken to be1998 since the recording of sales is likely to be 
more reliable for the most recent year. However, the results vary little with other 
selections of before and after years. A logarithmic transformation of equation 6 
is taken prior to parameter estimation. The variance of the error term (q) is: 
Weighted least squares is used to correct for the variation in the error variance 
across observations. 
4. RESULTS 
On the key commuter routes in the South East, there is competition between 
different season tickets and between season and daily tickets but data on 
season tickets was not available to us. The data which was available related to 
the annual volume of trips by first, full, reduced and apex tickets for 501 0 flows 
for the period 1990 to 1998. On some Non London inter-urban routes, there is 
little effective competition between ticket types since first class is not offered 
and reduced fare tickets are valid on all trains whilst on other routes the 
competition only really emerges towards the latter part of the time period. 
The analysis is therefore conducted on flows over 100 miles to and from 
London, where there has long been a relatively sophisticated ticketing 
structure. It is based on annual data for the period 1993 to 1998 since it is only 
from 1993 that Apex tickets haw been available. In addition, 1994 was 
removed given the serious industrial action in that year. 
The number of routes in our data are 441 between 100 and 200 miles and 269 
over 200 miles. Given that there are five years of data, and hence four ratios of 
demand changes, we have a maximum of 1764 and 1076 observations on the 
two sets of flows respectively. However, there are some cases where the 
changes in demand seemed on a first, full or reduced ticket appeared to be too 
large. Years were removed from the analysis where year-on-year demand 
more than doubled or halved. This reduced the data sets to 1608 and 900 
observations but we feel it removes the worst excesses of data inaccuracy. 
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Across the years in question, the correlation between the first and fill fares, 
first and reduced fares and full and reduced fares were 0.89, 0.87 and 0.82 
respectively for the 100-200 mile flows and 0.42, 0.50 and 0.34 for the over 200 
mile flows. The fare variation, in absolute, across the 5 years was 8.7%, 6.6% 
and 6.7% for first, full and reduced tickets on the 100-200 mile flows and 
15.2%, 14.5% and 9.1% on the over 200 mile flows. Hence there has been an 
appreciable amount of fare variation. 
Table 4 lists the parameter constraints given the inability to freely estimate 
these parameters within equation 6 due to multicollinearity. These figures are 
largely based upon the recommendations for business and leisure travel 
contained in the Railway Industry Forecasting Framework (Steer Davies 
Gleave, 1999), weighted for a 40:60 split between the two journey purposes. 
Table 4: Constrained Parameter Values 
Purpose Share Population Car Time Car Cost Car 
Y K h 0 
Business 40% 1 .O 0.30 0.10 0.00 
Leisure 60% 1 .O 0.30 0.30 -0.94 
Overall 1 .O 0.30 0.22 -0.56 
Table 5 lists the diversion factors used in this work. Enquiries were made with 
all the relevant train operating companies about whether they had information 
on diversion factors between ticket types. No such evidence was available and 
thus the figures in Table 5 are based on the collective judgments of members 
of the study team involved in updating the PDFH. Thus we are assuming that 
when a fare variation becomes sufficiently large to cause a behavioural switch, 
40% of current first class travellers will switch to full fare tickets. 
Table 5: Assumed Diversion Factors 
First Full Reduced Apex Not Rail 
First to: - 40% 20% 0% 40% 
Full to: 20% - 50% 5% 25% 
~ e d k d  to: 0% 40% - 30% 30% 
The zero diversion from reduced to first means that the cross elasticity between 
first and reduced is zero and hence no cross elasticity term ( f l ~ )  was specified 
in the demand system. Although the diversion between first and reduced is not 
zero, the volume of reduced travel far exceeds that by first class such that the 
cross elasticity would be very low. As a result, no cross elasticity was specified 
between reduced and first class ( f~ l ) .  In any event, the symmetry condition 
would require it to be zero. 
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The technique of iterative seemingly unrelated regression has been used to 
estimate the system of equations with the parameter restrictions imposed. 
There are two Slutsky symmetry restrictions, between f l ~  and f ~ ,  and between 
~ F R  and RF, and four restrictions based on the diversions factors between k 
and fil, f i ~  and ~FF, ~ R F  and ~ F F ,  and ~ F R  and ~RR. These restrictions were 
imposed at the mean revenue shares for equation 1 and the mean volumes in 
equation 2 across routes and years. 
Table 6 reports separate models for 100-200 miles (Models l a - I  e) and for over 
200 miles (Models 2a-2e). All the freely estimated parameters are reported. If 
the variables which are highly correlated with GDP and whose parameters are 
constrained are removed from the equation, the GDP elasticity increases but 
the estimated fare elasticities hardly differ. The reported GDP elasticity 
estimates are conditional upon the constrained elasticity values of Table 4. 
Models l a  and 2a are estimated as a system of equations but no constraints 
are imposed. The results are poor in almost all respects. Some cross 
elasticities are wrong sign, others that are correct sign are far from statistically 
significant, whilst the pattern of own elasticities is not entirely convincing and 
indeed the conditional elasticity for full fare in Model 2a is wrong sign. 
Models I b and 2b impose the symmetry condition of equation 1, whereupon 
the relevant pairs of cross elasticities have the same t ratios. The imposition of 
this condition does not improve matters greatly and indeed two of the four 
cross-elasticities in Model l b  are wrong sgn whilst in Model 2b two cross 
elasticities are far from significant and the conditional elasticity for full fare 
tickets remains positive. 
Models l c  and 2c ignore the symmetry conditions but do impose the 
relationship between cross and own elasticities using diversion factors as 
specified in equation 2. The jointly estimated parameters have the same t 
ratios. Model l c  now has all its cross elasticities as right sign and significant, 
although as a consequence the conditional elasticity for full fare tickets is very 
low. Model 2c can hardly be regarded an improvement over 2b since there are 
still two insignificant cross elasticities and the conditional elasticity for full fare 
tickets remains positive. 
Both the symmetry and the diversion factors constraints are imposed 
simultaneously in Models I d  and 2d. Given that the constraints uniquely 
determine the relativities, all that remains for the estimation process is to 
determine the scale of the coefficients. The joint estimation returns the same t 
ratio for all the fare coefficients and this is far higher than those generally 
obtained in the other models. In addition, all the elasticities are correct sign and 
their order of magnitude seems reasonable. 
As would be expected, imposition of the constraints reduces the goodness of 
fit, although only by a little, but offsetting this is the much greater degree of 
confidence that can be placed in the estimated parameters. 
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Table 6: Estimated Models 
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No significant effects upon first or full sales were obtained from VA. For the 100- 
200 miles flows, the estimated coefficient (T) was -0.058 (9.9). This implies a 
0.5% reduction in the volume of reduced ticket sales after a 10% increase in 
the volume of Apex tickets. The corresponding figure for the over 200 miles 
flows was -0.1 41 (4.9) which implies that a 10% increase in Apex sales will lead 
to a 1.5% fall in reduced ticket sales. 
There is little variation in the GDP elasticities across the different models for the 
100-200 mile flows, although more is apparent for the over 200 mile flows. For 
the shorter distances, it is the first and full markets which grew fastest, and 
these are dominated by business travel. However, our feeling is that tighter 
restrictions on the use of reduced fare tickets, which we did not have the data 
to model, will have contributed to the high GDP elasticity for full tickets. It may 
also have impacted on the estimated fare elasticities. For the longer distance 
flows, where there are fewer restrictions on the use of reduced tickets, sales of 
reduced tickets grew by more than full fare tickets, although again the GDP 
elasticity for first class is high. 
The conditional elasticities are sensible in relation to each other. The first class 
market is dominated by business travel and high income leisure travel and thus 
the fare elasticity is expected to be lower than for full fare tickets which does 
have a large share of business travel but by generally less senior employees. 
Reduced tickets are largely used by leisure travellers and hence the elasticity is 
expected to be relatively high. 
We cannot compare the cross-elasticities against other evidence since the 
other aggregate models that have been developed were unsatisfactory in this 
respect whilst the disaggregate ticket choice models that have been estimated 
do not report such figures. In any event, the latter cross elasticities would be 
stron~ly dependent upon the both the fare levels and market shares making 
com~a;ison' difficult. w e  can, however, compare the conditional elasticities 
estimated here with what can be interpreted to be approximately conditional 
elasticities derived from ticket sales models which split 'b~ ticket type but did not 
specify cross-elasticity terms. 
Owen and Phillips (1987) analysed demand on 20 long distance London based 
flows. The median first and standard class fare elasticity estimates were -1.0 
and -1.17. Ahmed (1998) reports fare elasticities on London routes for first, full 
and reduced tickets of -0.71 (k0.22), -0.81 (k0.12) and -0.83 (k0.12) 
respectively. Wardman and Dunkerley (1999) analysed ticket sales data for 
Great Western services and estimated elasticities for first class fares of -0.14 
on the top 25 revenue earning flows and -0.73 on other London flows. The 
corresponding figures for standard class, which combines full and reduced 
tickets, were -0.59 and -0.96. AEAT (1999) examined a large data set of flows 
and estimated models split by ticket type and distance. Results relevant for this 
study are presented in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Elasticities by  Ticket Type 
Distance First non Standard Standard 
Season Full Reduced 
75-149 miles -0.5M.11 -0.5M.08 -0.7M.05 
150-249 miles -0.3M.12 -0.3M.08 -1.1M.12 
250 miles and over -0.6M.14 -0.3M.11 -1.5M.22 
Source: AEAT (1 999) Table 1. 
Finally, in a recent meta-analysis covering 902 fare elasticities from British 
'studies, of which 456 were inter-urban rail travel obtained from 57 studies, 
Wardman and Shires (2003) estimated a model to explain variations in the 
elasticities. The model predicts nonconditional and conditional fare elasticities 
on London based flows of 150 miles of -0.73 and -0.68 for first, -0.82 and -0.66 
for full, and -1.23 and -0.93 for reduced. 
The conditional elasticities estimated here are therefore broadly consistent with 
other empirical evidence. 
The final models ( l e  and 2e) estimate overall models using the average fare 
across the different ticket types. Models were estimated to trips including and 
excluding those using Apex tickets, As expected, the elasticities are higher 
when the price sensitive Apex market is included. These models cannot explain 
trips as well as when there are separate equations by ticket type, and this is to 
be expected. However, it turns out that the elasticities estimated to the volume 
of trips excluding the Apex fares closely resembles what would be an average 
across the elasticities estimated by ticket type. 
In summary, we have demonstrated that the use of economic theory in the form 
of parameter constraints allows the estimation of models for separate ticket 
types with plausible own and cross elasticities. This procedure required that 
both the Slutsky symmetry and diversion factor based constraints were used. In 
the absence of these constraints, the results were most unsatisfactory and 
reminiscent of the findings of previous research in this area. 
Whilst the reported models represent a step forward in thisarea, there are a 
number of limitations: 
Equations 1 and 2 indicate that the cross-elasticities will vary widely 
according to market conditions, whereas we have estimated only a 
single set of cross-elasticities. The diversion factors can be expected 
to vary, as the strength of competition between tickets varies, and the 
revenue and volume shares differ over years and routes. The 
constraints were based on the mean values of the revenue shares 
and relative volumes due to software limitations. 
s Whilst more variation could be permitted by estimating separate sets 
of equations, or separate parameters within a single set of equations, 
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for different train operating companies or conditions, this would 
reduce the precision of the parameter estimates and in any event 
would not be practical for smaller companies. 
The approach cannot model new tickets. 
In its current form, the approach does not allow for changes in the 
travel restrictions associated with reduced tickets. Whilst in principle 
the approach could be amended to include terms which represent 
changes to travel restrictions, collecting the information would be a 
major task. Moreover, in many cases these are relatively small 
effects which would be difficult to detect. 
5. A COMPLEMENTARY APPROACH 
More recent work has extended the research to address some of the above 
limitations. This included the development of a more flexible procedure for 
estimating cross-elasticities and the extension to a broader set of flows. 
We can deduce the own and cross elasticities of a system of demand 
equations from the relationships between own and cross elasticities of equation 
2 and knowledge of the conditional elasticities (Toner et al., 2001). The 
conditional elasticity for a ticket i (Ci) is the sum of own and the relevant cross 
elasticities. To illustrate a two ticket system, we have: 
and: 
These equations can be solved simultaneously to yield: 
O Association for European Transport 2003 16 
The system readily extends to any number of ticket types. Given that the volume 
of sales of each ticket are known, own and cross elasticities tailored to specific 
situations can be estimated. Further situation specific results are obtained if 
information on how diversion factors vary is available. 
As part of research for the Strategic Rail Authority to support its review of fare 
regulation, we extended the empirical study in order to: 
Disaggregate the own and cross elasticities which had been 
estimated for inter-urban London based flows by the five train 
operating companies to allow for the specific circumstances of each; 
Estimate own and cmss elasticities for train operating companies not 
covered in our empirical study; 
Include new tickets in the system in anticipation of how the market 
might evolve; 
Conduct market research to improve understanding of diversion 
factors. 
We report below the results estimated for a specific train operating company 
operating long distance London based services, for comparison with our 
empirical results, and for a train operating company providing services on the 
dense suburban network centred around London in the South East of England. 
Table 8 contains the diversion factors and conditional elasticities used. The 
former were obtained from market research conducted on a variety of routes in 
January 2003. The latter were taken from the Passenger Demand Forecastirg 
Handbook (ATOC, 2002), assuming that a ticket specific elasticity is a 
conditional elasticity. The point-point tickets cover travel between rail stations 
only, whereas the Travelcard tickets additionally include travel on public 
transport within London. 
Table 8: Diversion Factors and Conditional Elasticities 
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The deduced elasticities are reported in Table 9. Since product specific 
elasticities are outside our realms of experience, it is difficult to say whether the 
own elasticities are reasonable or not: they could well be somewhat higher than 
the sort of elasticity figures we are accustomed to in these markets. However, 
we can comment upon the cross elasticity terms. 
As expected, there are high cross-elasticities between the travelcard and point- 
point tickets which serve as close substitutes. The degree of competition in the 
off-peak market is particularly marked. Nor is it surprising that there is generally 
little interaction between the season tickets and the off-peak tickets. With 
regard to the full fare daily ticket, there is a strong interaction with the point- 
point reduced ticket. Thus they are prepared to switch departure times but 
would seem to be a different market to Travelcard users. As for those using a 
reduced ticket with Travelcard, the strong interaction with full day tickets could 
be explained by lesser price sensitivity, which underlies their purchase of the 
Travelcard add-on, and thus when they switch they are more prepared to pay 
for the premium full fare product. 
Table 9: Deduced Own and Cross Elasticities 
The London elasticities differ from those empirically estimated. This is to be 
expected given the different diversion factors used and that the relative shares 
relate to a specific route in 200112 rather than an average across the period 
1993 and 1998 for flows across many different routes. Nonetheless, the results 
do have similarities with those empirically estimated. For example, the full fare 
own elasticity is high, reflecting the strong competition it faces, and there is 
virtually no interaction between first and reduced. The impacts of variations in 
full fare on first and reduced demand are also similar between the two 
methods. 
In principle, the approach can be extended to include new tickets, but this 
requires robust estimates of the likely shares of the new tickets and their 
conditional elasticities. The former is simplified if the new tickets exist on other 
train operating companies whilst it might be possible to deduce a conditional 
elasticity from the elasticities of adjacent tickets. 
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The Apex fare is allowed to impact on the demand for the other tickets but does 
not have its own elasticity because it is quota controlled. There is no problem 
having more 'columns' than 'rows' since the additional cross elasticities are 
simply deduced from equation 2. 
The procedure above attaches particular importance to the availability of 
conditional elasticity estimates. h some cases, only one elasticity is known: the 
overall market elasticity with respect to average revenue. In this case, and for 
two tickets, we have: 
This can be decomposed into: 
that is, the volume weightedsum of the conditional elasticities equals the 
overall market elasticity. So given b and the volumes, specifying one 
conditional elasticity immediately generates the other. A way forward in practice 
could be to use complementary techniques, such as disaggregate choice 
models based on RP or SP data to determine the relativities of G and G, 
along with ticket sales models to estimate b. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The research reported here has enhanced aggregate rail demand models 
based on ticket sales data by estimating a system of equations representing 
different tickets where explicit allowance is made for the degree of competition 
between them. This has harnessed relationships apparent within economic 
theory, which turned out to be critical to the estimation of robust models with 
reasonable parameters. This contrasts with previous unsuccessful studies in 
this area. The results have been included within the recommendations 
contained in the Passenger Demand Forecasting Handbook (ATOC, 2002) 
which is widely used in the railway industry in Great Britain. 
We have then proceeded to illustrate a method which can be used to provide a 
much greater level of detail than is possible using the econometric approach. 
This allows the own and cross elasticities within a system of equations 
representing the demand for different tickets to be deduced from evidence on 
conditional elasticities and diversion factors between tickets. This has enabled 
own and cross elasticity estimates to be obtained for a much wider range of 
situations and has contributed to the Strategic Rail Authority's review of fare 
regulation. 
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We do not claim that this is the final word on this subject; indeed it represents 
only the beginning of what will hopefully be more detailed analysis of 
competition between tickets and operators. It is hoped that the new procedure 
outlined here will have a role to play in enabling generalisation of the 
recommendations contained in PDFH and a more flexible approach to 
forecasting. 
The two methods have a degree of complementarity about them. The empirical 
method requires the Slutsky symmetry condition, which relies upon the 
assumption of conventional economic theory, because it contributes to the 
estimation of reasonable conditional elasticities. On the other hand, the 
deductive method does not use the Slutsky method but is reliant upon sensible 
conditional elasticities. Whilst the deductive method provides much more 
flexibility than the econometric method, it is the latter which provides the 
conditional elasticities and also a range of other elasticity evidence. 
Further work should involve the inclusion of variables representing travel 
restrictions in both approaches, a better understanding of variations in diversion 
factors, more variation in the conditional and own ehsticities according to the 
fare charged and market share, and the exploration of possible links with 
disaggregate means of analysing ticket choice. 
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